Abstract. On the ground of Kant's reformulation of the principle of contradiction, a non-classical logic KC and its extension KC+ are constructed. In KC and KC+, ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ), φ → (¬φ → ψ), and φ ∨ ¬φ are not valid due to specific changes in the meaning of connectives and quantifiers, although there is the explosion of derivable consequences from {φ, ¬φ} (the deduction theorem lacking). KC and KC+ are interpreted as fragments of an S5-based first-order modal logic M. The quantification in M is combined with a "subject abstraction" device, which excepts predicate letters from the scope of modal operators. Derivability is defined by an appropriate labelled tableau system rules. Informally, KC is mainly ontologically motivated (in contrast, for example, to Jaśkowski's discussive logic), relativizing state of affairs with respect to conditions such as time.
Introduction
According to Kant's formulation of the principle of contradiction, a contradiction can occur only in the relation between the "subject" and the "predicate" of a categorical proposition (a, e, i, and o propositions in the logical square). Starting from that formulation of the principle of contradiction, we want to describe a non-classical logic KC where φ ∧ ¬φ and ¬(φ ∨ ¬φ) are satisfiable as predicates of a categorical proposition, even under the existential import of the subject term of the proposition. KC is half-paraconsistent in that ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ) and φ → (¬φ → ψ) are not theorems of KC, but, at the same time, an explosion of consequences is derivable form {φ, ¬φ}. We will disregard the non-explosiveness of Kant's syllogistic, where the derivability is constricted to the traditional syllogistic figures (for example, {∀x(M x → P x), ¬∀x(M x → P x)} ∃x(Sx ∧ P x) [14, p. 293] ).
We start with the analysis of Kant's examples that illustrate his formulation of the principle of contradiction. Second, we describe a non-classical logic KC as a shorthand for a fragment of S5-based first-order modal logic, and define an appropriate tableau system. Next, we extend KC to KC+ with strict conditional and strict disjunction. Finally, we sketch a proof of the adequacy of the tableau system for KC+.
The principle of contradiction

Kant's formulation of the principle
In the Section 'The highest principle of all analytic judgments' of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant criticizes the following formulation of the principle of contradiction originating from Aristotle and Plato: PC * : It is impossible that something should at one and the same time both be and not be.
(B 191) 1 PC * is not acceptable for Kant as a principle of logic because it contains a time condition ('at one and the same time'), which is not for him a logical concept. Kant adopts the principle of contradiction in the following formulation, which is based solely on the logical form of a categorical proposition, i.e., on the relation of a predicate to the subject of a proposition: 2
PC:
No predicate contradictory of a thing can belong to it. (B 190) 3 "Thing" is referred to by the subject of a proposition. Thus, it is not a violation of PC if two predicates of a subject negate each other, if only they do not negate the subject. On Kant's presuppositions, this leads straightforwardly to the non-classicality of logic in the way to be illustrated by examples and more precisely explained below. According to Kant, the principle of identity, A is A, is already contained in PC, since Kantian contradiction relates to negation in a classical way: the negation of a self-contradictory proposition (where the predicate contradicts the subject) is valid. As Kant says: "since the opposite of the concept would contradict the object, the concept itself must necessarily be affirmed of it" (B 190-191 ).
Some examples
Let us, first, pause on an example by which Kant illustrates the need of his reformulation of the principle of contradiction:
A man who is unlearned is not learned. (B 192) (
In (1), 'unlearned' is (universally) affirmed as a predicate of the subject 'man', and 'learned' is denied as a predicate of the same subject. Since 'unlearned' and 'learned' are merely predicates not being included or excluded by the subject itself, (1) is not true by PC, according to Kant. In other words and according to Kant's nomenclature, (1) is not an analytic proposition, because for Kant a categorical proposition is analytic if and only if "its truth can always be adequately known in accordance with the principle of contradiction" (B 190) 4 ). That means that in each analytic proposition either what contradicts the subject is denied, or what is contained in the subject must be affirmed, which is obviously not the case in (1) if only 'man' is conceived as the subject term of (1).
Consequently, the following proposition can be stated without Kantian contradiction:
Some men who are unlearned are learned,
interpreted indistinguishably to the Aristotelian way: what is A cannot at the same time be non-A. For example, according to Leibniz, it is included in the principle of contradiction "that the same proposition cannot be true and false at the same time [à la fois]", and hence "what is A cannot be non A [11, vol. 5, p. 343] ; cf. also a letter to S. Clarke (with 'en même temps' instead of 'à la fois') [10, vol. 6, p. 355] . 4 In other words, "the principle of contradiction must . . . be recognized as being the universal and completely sufficient principle of all analytic knowledge" (B 191).
since neither predicate 'unlearned', nor predicate 'learned' contradict the subject 'men'. To put it another way, the same man could be unlearned (at one time), as well as learned (at another time). Generalizing Kant's conception (where only time as a predicate relativizing condition is mentioned), we could say that the same man can be in one sense, or in one possible world, unlearned, and in another sense, or in another possible world, learned:
(where M 1 stands for '. . . is a man', and L 1 for '. . . is learned').
In distinction to (2), the following proposition:
Some unlearned men are learned (B 192)
according to Kant, disobeys PC, in that it predicates to the subject ('unlearned man') what contradicts the subject, and therefore in no way could be true.
On the other hand, the proposition No unlearned man is learned (B 192)
is true precisely by PC. That is, it is analytic, 'unlearned man' being the subject, and the predicate 'learned' (which contradicts the subject) being denied of the subject.
Logic KC
On the ground of Kant's conception of contradiction, we can describe a Kantian non-classical quantificational logic KC (a logic of "Kantian contradiction"), with analytic propositions, as defined in the previous section, among its theorems. A crucial point for KC will be to distinguish a subject term from the predicate term in the way that the constituents of the subject term can be clearly traced within the predicate term. This cannot be accomplished by translating categorical sentences of the logical square (a, e, i, o) into a familiar language of classical first-order logic. In the latter approach, we could not clearly distinguish, for example, between sentence (1) (where the article 'a' should be understood as 'each') and sentence (4), since both could be classically translated as ∀x((M x ∧ ¬Lx) → ¬Lx), although (1) is nonanalytic and (4) analytic. Similarly, both sentence (2) and sentence (3) could be classically translated as ∃x((M x ∧ ¬Lx) ∧ ¬Lx), although (2) is non-contradictory and (3) contradictory.
To distinguish the subject term and the predicate term within a formula of KC, we will use the angle notation for quantified conditionals and conjunctions:
where M x and Lx are the subject term and the predicate term, respectively. The predicate letter L in (5), which does not occur in the subject term, is treated as logically independent of the subject term in the sense that it cannot produce a Kantian contradiction (according to PC). However, the following sentence contains a contradiction:
being in fact a translation of (3). In (6) the predicate letter L is subject dependent (since it occurs in the subject term, not only in the predicate term), and is both affirmed (in the predicate term) and denied (in the subject term). For evaluating the same predicate letter in the same sentence in different ways, a modal semantics can be applied, where values of predicate letters are relativized with respect to different semantic points ("possible world"). Accordingly, the satisfaction conditions of formulas will be redefined in a modal way. In the result, the subject term of a formula will be rigid regarding the predicate letters occurring in the subject term, in the sense that those predicate letters will be evaluated with respect to the same point throughout the formula. At the same time, a predicate term will be non-rigid regarding its constituent predicate letters that do not occur in the subject term, that is, they could be evaluated with respect to different semantic points. Remark 1. We note that, in fact, Kant's idea was not to advocate a kind of non-classical logic. Obviously, Kant did not regard "copulative proposition" (a kind of conjunction) as a logical form (logical "unity") and hence did not include it in his well known table of propositions. Apparently, "copulative proposition" was for him a plurality of psychologically associated propositions merely linguistically put together in one sentence (thus, a sentence with many predicates of one subject stands for many categorical propositions). Therefore, Kant reformulated the principle of contradiction in order to make it independent of what were for him non-logical conditions. We aim to show that Kant's "copulative proposition" is a kind of non-classical conjunction, which can be combined with Kant's principle of contradiction in one (non-classical) logic. 5 Let us now see the details of the formal description of the logic KC.
Languages K C and M
The vocabulary of K C consists of n-place predicate letters (P n , Q n , R n , with or without subscripts; informally, we also use other latin capital letters), individual terms (individual variables u, x, y, z, and individual constants c, d, e, with or without subscripts), connectives (¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔), quantifier symbols (∀, ∃), parentheses and brackets.
The set Form K C of formulas of K C consists of atomic formulas Φt 1 . . . t n , where t i is an individual term, compound formulas ¬φ, Square bracket indication is not an operator (e.g., an atomic formula with a square bracket indication is still an atomic formula), so that the main operator of φ[Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n ] is the same as the main operator of φ. The purpose of the square bracket indication will be explained below. In fact, a formula without a square bracket indication can be conceived as having empty square bracket notation. Note a special use of angle brackets to delimit immediate subformula in a quantified formula. In addition, only a conjunction and a conditional can be the immediate subformula of a quantified formula, since K C is designed primarily to formalize quantification in Kantian logic, which is restricted to the sentences of the logical square. For the sake of generality, we allow n-place predicate letters, although Kantian quantification logic is merely monadic. We say that φ and ψ are the subject term and the predicate term, respectively, of ∀x φ → ψ , ∃x φ ∧ ψ , ¬∀x φ → ψ , and ¬∃x φ ∧ ψ . In addition, a quantified and negated quantified formula will be called an
In what follows, a translation from K C to a first-order modal language M will be important. M is familiar except that it has predicate variables X n 1 , X n 2 , . . . , atomic formulas Xt 1 . . . t n , and subject abstraction formulas of the form (X.φ)(Φ) (
Subject abstraction in M is meant to except each atomic formula in which a predicate letter Φ occurs from the scope of any modal operator in φ. We say that Φ and Φt 1 . . . t n are bound by subject abstraction (X.φ)(Φ). 6 For example, in
, is excepted from the scope of 2. In
, is excepted from the scope of 2 (as in the example above), but it remains within the scope of 3. Nested subject abstractions,
will be abbreviated in the following way:
Let Form M be the set of formulas of M . We will now define a translation function T from K C into M . The translation T does not grammatically change formulas inside a subject term, except for angle brackets, which become parentheses. Outside a subject term, T modalizes immediate subformulas of compounds if compounds are not bound by a subject abstraction.
T (φ) = φ, with parentheses in the right side φ instead of angle brackets in the left side φ, if the left side φ is a subformula of a subject term, otherwise:
where Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n are all and only predicate letters occurring in φ
Remark 2 (Square bracket indication). Sometimes we need to translate a formula φ as if each of the predicate letters Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n occurs in the subject term of φ, although some of Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n may actually not occur in that term or φ even may not have a subject term at all. To that end, we have introduced a new kind of formulas, φ[Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n ], and apply the translation function T in accordance with the last case in Definition 1.
Γ[Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n ] will be like a set Γ except that to each φ ∈ Γ a square bracket indication [Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n ] is added.
Semantics for K C and M
The main semantic concepts for the language K C and its logic KC are defined by means of the semantics for the formerly introduced modal language M and its modal logic M. We, first, semantically outline the logic M, and after that, we define the main semantic concepts of KC.
Outline of the semantics of M
A model M of the logic M is an S5-based quantificational model with (for simplicity) a universal accessibility relation and a constant domain. It is a quintuple W, R, D, I , where W is a non-empty set (of worlds, moments of time), R the universal relation on W (i.e., W × W ), 7 D a non-empty set (of objects), and I an interpretation such that I(c) ∈ D and I(Φ n , w ∈ W ) ∈ ℘D n (c is an individual constant, and Φ n an n-placed predicate letter).
Variable assignment
New satisfaction cases for M to be defined are the satisfaction of an atomic formula with a predicate variable:
and the satisfaction of a subject abstraction formula:
That is, Φ remains evaluated at w through the whole φ, regardless of the modal context in φ in which Φ may occur. The other cases of the satisfaction of translated formulas are defined in a way familiar in first-order modal logic with a constant domain.
The semantics of KC
The models of KC are precisely the models of M. The following semantic concepts of KC and its language are defined locally, that is, with respect to a world in a model, and with the help of the translation function T .
Definition 2 (Satisfaction in KC)
.
It is easy to see that under universal accessibility relation R in M, for each compound formula (φ * ψ) without a square bracket indication ( * is a two-place connective), it holds that M, w |= KC
7 Models with a universal relation R can for present purposes sufficiently represent Kantian time. For, as is known, asymmetry, transitivity and comparability for time operators H ('always in the past') and G ('always in the future') give equivalence relation for the operator A ('always'). Universal relation is a special case of equivalence relation, with only one equivalence class of worlds (moments of time). Definition 7 (Self-contradictory formula in KC). ∀x ψ → ψ , ∃x ψ ∧ ψ , and their equivalents are self-contradictory iff |= KC ψ → ¬χ .
The validity of traditional inferences on SP -sentences ("immediate consequences", "categorical syllogisms") is preserved if each subject term in an inference is treated as if it is a subject term of each sentence in the inference, in the way defined by the following special cases of the consequence relation and of the corresponding satisfiability property: (4) into M , we can easily see that they are non-analytic, non-selfcontradictory, selfcontradictory, and analytic, respectively:
1. non-analytic ("synthetic") sentence:
A man who is unlearned is not learned,
(3¬Lx → 2¬Lx))(M )) (the sentence is conceived universally, as an e sentence), 2. non-selfcontradictory sentence:
3. self-contradictory sentence: Some unlearned men are learned,
analytic sentence:
No unlearned man is learned,
)(M, L)).
In the first and the second of the above translations, subject abstraction could be omitted because it appears only vacuously, and in the third and the fourth translation the subject abstraction for M and X could be omitted for the same reason.
The above examples clearly indicate that KC is paraconsistent in the sense that φ ∧ ¬φ is satisfiable (see sentence 2) without the explosion of consequences. KC is paracomplete too, since φ ∨ ¬φ of K C (being interpreted in M as 2φ ∨ 2¬φ) is non-valid. We will return to the paraconsistency and paracompleteness of KC at the end of this section.
Remark 3. There are some similarities (as well as differences) between the propositional fragment of KC and Jaśkowski's discussive logic D 2 [4, 5, 6 ] (see also, for example, [12] ), first of all in the modal approach to the semantics, and, in particular, in the similar interpretation of the conditional and the conjunction (cf. 3φ → ψ and φ ∧ 3ψ of D 2 ). The propositional fragment of KC is, in a sense, more classical then discussive logic, in that, for example, in KC conjunction, disjunction, and conditional are classically interdefinable. In addition, theorems of KC can be modally interpreted as necessities, not merely as possibilities (like "theses", which are discussive counterparts of classical theorems). Note that discussive conjunction as a thesis becomes equivalent to 3φ ∧ 3ψ (which is the modal interpretation of the conjunction of K C ).
Philosophically, the difference between discussive logic and KC lies in the fact that discussive logic is primarily subjective and methodologically motivated by the cases where there is a lack of a uniform opinion or of a uniform meaning of terms, while KC is primarily objective and ontologically motivated by the non-uniformity of the state of affairs through time. 8 
The principle of contradiction in the square of oppositions
Although KC is paraconsistent, all the oppositions of the logical square of categorical propositions hold in KC if we presuppose the existential import for the subject term. For the proof, compare the semantics of the translations of categorical propositions of K C into the modal language M . The oppositions hold in each Kripke frame. See as an example the figure below with a compound predicate term, and ∃x Sx as a general assumption for all propositions in the square. Figure: the square of translations in M , ∃x Sx presupposed
Conversion and categorical syllogism
In a categorical inference of KC, a subject term of a premise or a conclusion is a subject term of the whole inference (see Definition 8) . In that way, familiar conversions and categorical syllogisms remain valid.
Since predicate terms of the first premise and of the conclusion do not contain any predicate letter that occurs in their respective subject terms, we omitted the subject abstraction from the first premise and the conclusion of the M inference (right side) as unnecessary. The right side inference is valid in each Kripke frame.
Tableau system for KC
We present the tableau rules for the logic KC, and conceive the rules as a formal proof system. Each sentence in a tableau is labelled. As usual, we start a tableau from a set of assumptions with the same label n, and try to prove the inconsistency of the set by obtaining, in each path, both m φ and m ¬φ for an atomic φ. As usual, α refers to non-branching rules for connectives, β refers to branching rules for connectives, γ refers to universal instantiation rules, and δ refers to existential instantiation rules. In justifications of lines on the right side of a tableau, there are also annotations about the label to which a subject term predicate letter is associated. The number of a line and the name of a rule in a justification are separated by a slash. Closure and openness conditions for a tableau are as in classical tableaux, with the addition that literals that cause the closing of a path should have the same label, no matter whether any of those literals has a square bracket indication appended or not. 9 Finally, the proof of φ from Γ, i.e., Γ ⊢ KC φ (Γ and φ unlabelled), is a closed tableau for Γ ∪ {¬φ}.
In proving categorical inferences we will treat the premises and the conclusion analogously to Definition 8 (and Example 2).
Example 5. In the following tableau, square bracket indications are added where that makes a difference in the application of a rule. Each assumption has a square bracket indication.
ass.
All traditional categorical syllogisms that are valid without the existential import for the subject term are valid with respect to KC tableau system, provided premises and the conclusion are expressed by a square bracket indication [Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n ], where Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n are all and only predicate letters occurring in the premises and the conclusion.
Proof. The proof is obvious from the fact that all immediate subformulas of quantified formulas in a syllogism and all predicate letters occurring in subject terms come under the same label. All subject terms of a syllogism behave therefore in a classical way (as if they are not labelled). It is easy to check that the tableau decomposition of both (classical) subject terms and (possibly non-classical) predicate terms result with a classical contradiction (path closure condition). ⊣ Proposition 2 (Theorems of KC).
Proposition 4 (Derivability in KC).
Proposition 5 (Non-derivability in KC).
Proposition 6 (Deductive equivalences in KC). Beside the commutativity and the associativity of ∧ and ∨, we mention the following equivalences.
Propositions 2-6 can be checked by the KC tableau system. Note that some quantificational theorems from Proposition 2 become non-theorems when the quantifier is omitted (see Proposition 3) (e.g., the classical principle of contradiction, the principle of double negation). Further, for example, the classical definition of the conditional (by ¬ and ∨), the commutativity, associativity, and De Morgan's laws for ∧ and ∨ hold as theorems as well as derivability relations. In contrast, the law of distribution does not hold neither as a theorem, nor as a derivability relation. Note the asymmetry between theoremhood and derivability: for example, ex contradictione quodlibet and the principle of double negation hold as derivability relations, but not as theorems.
Corollary 1. The deduction theorem for KC does not hold.
Proof. According to propositions 4 and 3, {φ, ¬φ} ⊢ KC ψ, but KC φ → (¬φ → ψ). See the same propositions for the principle of double negation.
(B 99), he plainly does not relativize the meaning of the statement only to one moment of time (in the sense in which "A man is learned" means that the man is learned at one time, but can be unlearned at another time). The same holds for Kant's example of the hypothetical proposition: "If there is a perfect justice, the obstinately wicked are punished" (B 98).
In K C + we allow ∀x and ∃x to be applied to φ ψ and φ ⊻ ψ, so that we get the formulas of the form ∀x(φ ψ) and ∀x(φ ⊻ ψ), and similarly for ∃x. What Kant meant under "hypothetical proposition" ("judgment") were not only the propositions of the form of the strict conditional, but also the propositions of the form ∀x(φ ψ). Similarly, under (exclusively) disjunctive proposition Kant meant not only the propositions of the form φ ⊻ ψ, but also the propositions of the form ∀x(φ ⊻ ψ).
Kant's idea was to strengthen the logical "unity" of a proposition in comparison to categorical propositions. According to Kant's theory of propositions, we can distinguish three grades of the logical unity of propositions regarding the possible truth of mutually contradictory predications 11 :
1. the weakest unity is the "relation" of a predicate to the subject in a categorical proposition: mutually contradictory predications to the same (non-contradictory) subject can both be true if only they do not contradict the subject (Kant's principle of contradiction);
2. the next, stronger, unity is the "relation" of a consequent to the antecedent in a hypothetical proposition: mutually contradictory predications cannot both be true consequents of the same true antecedent, but can both be its false consequents; a true antecedent has simply a plurality of mutually non-contradictory predications as its true consequents (the principle of sufficient reason); tableau rules of KC with the addition of the following rules:
n ¬ψ, ¬ψ any n Regarding our discussion of paraconsistency and paracompleteness of Kantian logic, it is obvious that it is not paraconsistent with respect to . For the proof, we first introduce a weak conjunction, φ ⊼ ψ, by the following translation to M :
Thus ⊢ KC+ ¬(φ⊼¬φ). Since ⊢ KC+ (φ ψ) ↔ ¬(φ⊼¬ψ), and ⊢ KC+ (φ ψ), paraconsistency is excluded with respect to the weak conjunction, and hence with respect to the strict conditional. In addition, it is obvious that KC+ is not paracomplete with respect to ⊻, since ⊢ KC+ φ ⊻ ¬φ.
Soundness and completeness
As a preliminary to the sketch of the soundness and completeness proofs for the KC+ tableau system, we define the satisfaction of a labelled formula and the satisfiability of a set of labelled formulas in KC+.
Definition 10 (KC+-satisfaction of a labelled formula).
Proof. The corollary is obvious from the generalization of Definition 2 to KC+, and Definition 10. ⊣ Definition 11 (KC+-satisfiability of a labelled set). A set Γ of labelled formulas of K C + is KC+-satisfiable iff there are M and v such that for each n φ ∈ Γ, M |= KC + v n φ.
Since each tableau path (which extends from the beginning of the tableau to the end of a branch) is a set of labelled formulas of K C +, we can speak of the KC+-satisfiability of a tableau path too.
Soundness
First, we show that KC+ tableau rules preserve the satisfiability in a tableau.
Proposition 7 (Satisfiability preservation). If a tableau T has at least one satisfiable path, and T ′ is the extension of T by a tableau rule for members of T , then T ′ too has a satisfiable path.
Proof. For α rules, observe that, according to the semantics of KC+, both n α 1 Similarly, the results of applying γ and δ rules are true for models that satisfy a path p in T , p containing γ and δ, respectively.
In an analogous way, the application of α, β, γ, and δ rules to the formulas with a square bracket indication also preserves a satisfiable path in a tableau. ⊣ Theorem 1 (Soundness). If Γ ⊢ KC+ φ, then Γ |= KC+ φ.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 7 that, if a tableau for a set n Γ∪{n ¬φ} of labelled formulas eventually has on each path a pair m φ and m ¬φ for an atomic φ, then n Γ∪{n ¬φ} itself cannot be a tableau with a satisfiable path. That is, if Γ ∪ {¬φ} has a closed tableau, then Γ ∪ {¬φ} is not satisfiable (see Corollary 5) . (Note that a closed tableau for a finite set ∆ is also a closed tableau for any infinite superset of ∆). Since the tableau method is conceived as a formal proof method, where Γ ⊢ KC+ φ iff Γ ∪ {¬φ} has a closed tableau, the theorem obviously follows. ⊣ Proof. If Γ ∪ {¬φ} has a tableau with an open path, then n Γ ∪ {n ¬φ} is a subset of a labelled Hintikka set (Proposition 8), and therefore n Γ ∪ {n ¬φ} is satisfiable (see Proposition 9) . Hence, Γ ∪ {¬φ} is also satisfiable (see Corollary 5) . After the contraposition, the theorem follows, since a tableau without an open path is closed, and hence is a proof of φ from Γ. ⊣
